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Abstract:  Abstract:  Abstract:  Abstract:  Abstract: This article discusses the methodological differences between the
British school and the American school of international relations. It attempts
to demonstrate that Susan Strange, representative of the British school, could
be considered a critical realist. The aim of the article is to show that her
vision of international political economy fulfills the methodological
reorientation initiated in economics by Tony Lawson at the end of the 90s.
Strange’s radical ontology claims that structural power determines human
actions. The paper contrasts Strange’s approach with that of John Ruggie,
from the American school, who identifies himself as a social constructivist.
Ruggie emphasizes the role of ideational factors in international relations
and the constructed nature of social reality.
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Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
Critical international political economy is a heterodox approach of
international relations (IR) which addresses the relationship between States and
Firms, by assuming that States are creating the structure in which Firms are
acting as agency. The field of IR has evolved since the 1970s through a
redefinition of the ontology. Susan Strange called for a more “economic” view of
IR, States and Firms being the main actors on the international stage. States are
not only confronting on political or security matters, but more on economic
issues, concerning development and financing.Roxana Bobulescu 38
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What is interesting is the way in which this ontological shift, pioneered by
Strange, reflected in the rise of a new discipline, called international political
economy (IPE). I will show in this paper that the important ontological move
led by Strange with the IPE was essentially a critical realist one. My thesis is
that Susan Strange could be considered a critical realist. My interpretation,
which is based on Lawson’s 2003 book, will be defended and detailed in the first
part of the paper. It is now recognised as the British IPE, dominantly
structuralist, represented by the journals Review of International Political
Economy (RIPE) and New Political Economy (NPE), a heterodox approach to
international relations (IR) by its fundamental opposition to IR utilitarian
mainstream.
On the American side, the mainstream IR approach, represented by the
International Organisation (IO) journal, continues to be the academic reference.
But in reaction to the British, critical IPE, the IO journal developed its own
heterodoxy, a social constructivist one, later on in the 1990s. Social
constructivist IR and critical IPE share a common view on interdisciplinarity
and pluralism and a common rejection of the neo-utilitarian mainstream.
I interpret the social constructivist American school as a way to save the IO
mainstream, to keep it dominant by building a distinct IPE, grounded in a
postmodern philosophy. The American constructivist IPE did not completely cut
with the mainstream, neo-utilitarian approach. According to Ruggie, there are
many bridges between the two IO approaches, so the American constructivist
IPE appears as an “orthodox heterodoxy” (Murphy & Nelson 2001). This will be
treated in the second part of the paper.
The two heterodoxies, i. e. the British and the American one, are close to each
other in their pluralism and openness to the ontology debate, but opposed with
respect to their critical realist and social constructivist views. An example of this
could be the importance placed on history: central to British critical realism,
and marginal to American social constructivism.
This ontological concern stimulated fervour by giving birth to new insights,
creating two distinct schools of thought on international organisations. I will
focus on the methodological features of both schools, by analysing their
respective visions, as they appear implicit for Strange (1994) and explicit for
Ruggie (1998).The Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:2 (2011) 39
Bobulescu, Roxana (2011) ‘Critical Realism versus Social Constructivism in international
relations’, The Journal of Philosophical Economics, IV:2, 37-64
On the American side, postmodernist influence led to constructivism, which
states that social reality is ideational, i.e. constructed by our mind, like all
social phenomena, whether it be money or Valentine’s Day (Ruggie 1998 inspired
by Weber 1949). There is no pre-existing social reality. One of the constructivist
paths (but not the only one, see Ruggie 1998) is discourse analysis, mixing
structure and agency, by considering that international structure is not only
conditioning state action, but is state action, reflecting identity and interests
(Wendt 1987). The result of social constructivism is greater relativity in the way
you conceive social phenomena and their continuous transformation. From the
constructivist point of view, for example, one can study companies’ ecological
turn as a response to a change in aspirations of the civil society, thus the
collective intentionality becoming increasingly concerned with sustainable
development. The overt commitment for a more socially responsible attitude as
regards people and nature can be revealed by the discourse of the managers. This
is the outcome of the influence that the civil society exerts on States and
Markets, by reshaping their interests and redefining their identity. As Ruggie
(1988) puts it, the increasing role of nongovernmental actors, of the
transnational civil society, gives to the State a “multiperspectival” form.
The same fact is analysed differently from a critical realist perspective. The
ecological turn in the companies’ behaviour can be interpreted in a structure-
agency framework. The structural power, more political in nature, imposes the
change to the economic sphere. The agency, which is the companies’ ecological
activity, is indirectly determined by the structural power shaped by the States
and international organisations through interventions, activism and campaigns.
The companies adapt their strategy to the new market conditions in order to
keep up with their competition.
Regarding US hegemony in IR, constructivists analyse the discourse of the US
and their representation of their dominant role, identities and values,
explaining changes in American diplomacy as a result of a mix of
representations. The hegemony would then be the result of this socially
constructed representation. In a critical realist perspective, Strange considers
that we should understand US hegemony through its economic dominance, its
structuring presence, defined mainly by its economic power. She opposes the
international regimes approach, which seems temporally fixed, exogenously
given, and without considering the economic sector or the importance of
production and finance. American multinational firms and their growingRoxana Bobulescu 40
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international influence cannot be ignored by theorists of IPE. In order to
understand and intervene in the State-Firm relationship, a critical analyst
should infer their behaviour not only from their discourse, but also from their
economic structure and political means. In defining its ontology, critical IPE
insists upon historical facts, data, and is not concerned with language (Murphy
& Nelson 2001, Ruggie 1998)
This paper will present the two different orientations in IPE by studying the
works of the authors who made strong recommendations for methodology. These
works provide rich material for research because they represent the emergence of
a new paradigm, a process which increases the ontological concern and rises an
institutional questioning of the future of a newly created discipline.
In the first part I intend to show that Susan Strange’s contribution should be
considered a critical realist attempt to build a ‘radical ontology’. In the second
part I will present the alternative approach of IR built upon social
constructivist methodology.
Ontology of Critical IPE: a critical realist Ontology of Critical IPE: a critical realist Ontology of Critical IPE: a critical realist Ontology of Critical IPE: a critical realist Ontology of Critical IPE: a critical realist
assessment of the British School assessment of the British School assessment of the British School assessment of the British School assessment of the British School
The critical realist project
In 1997, Tony Lawson of Cambridge University (Economics and Reality) called
for the reorientation of economics and social science in general, for a greater
consideration of the nature of its subject and towards a stronger interest in
ontology (“nature of social reality”). The choice of methodology should rest on
the understanding of the nature of the studied object. What distinguishes social
science from other sciences is the nature of its subject. As these ontologies differ,
they cannot be studied in the same way. For example, understanding the
structure of a material makes it possible to deduce its characteristics (e.g. in
physics: strength, conductivity, permeability) and to predict certain physical or
chemical actions or reactions. In social sciences, the structure and actions of the
agents interact; it is difficult to explain certain economic behaviours without
understanding the social or political structure in which they take place. Future
behaviour is conditioned by the nature of these interactions: “Just as social
structure cannot be understood independently of considerations of human
powers, the natural order in which both the social and the psychological areThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:2 (2011) 41
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embedded, and upon which they can act back, must be recognised as a condition
for social action and thus as an object of social study.” (Lawson 2003: 161)
Ontology supposes, on the one hand, an understanding of the often implicit
concepts of the nature and structure of reality (which are presumed by the
utilisation of the practices and procedures of research) and, on the other hand,
the construction of a model of reality (nature and structure) which encompasses
all of the current developments as well as particular cases. This results in greater
theoretical pluralism, and thus fulfils the most cherished wishes of Susan
Strange. Indeed, no theoretical approach could claim to be “universal”, and this
is why the current state of economics is a “failure of the modern discipline to
match its methods to the nature of its subject-matter. Indeed, modern economics
provides a very clear example of a rather narrow way of doing research being
unthinkingly and erroneously universalised a priori, with unfortunate
consequences.” (Lawson 2003: xviii). Lawson is implicitly referring to the “homo
oeconomicus” hypothesis applied to economics, and which claims universality
thanks to its use in political sciences, via approaches to Public choice. A more
realistic approach, more in keeping with the underlying world vision would
make it possible to adapt the method to the reality to be studied, to render
ontology explicit and achieve a realist social theorising.
Today, it is becoming more and more evident that mathematical formalisation is
a necessary condition to become a card-carrying member of the mainstream. It is
at the heart of teachings at university economics departments, which is not the
case for business schools or political sciences institutes. This explains the fact
that IPE provides an institutional alternative for the accomplishment of the
pluralist project, because it enables non-mainstreamers to evolve and develop a
heterodox approach with a richer, more explicit ontology. It will enable
theorists of different approaches to define their vision of the world and to
understand economics, and politics as branches of social science, each one
shedding light on aspects of social life and of the reality they are studying. The
interdisciplinary thus becomes pluridisciplinary, opening the door to other
disciplines, in an approach that will leave more room for criticism and ontology.
Cooperation between disciplines will become a vector for the study of different
facets of the same reality. To explain this, let us consider globalisation, which is
the central issue of the new political economy. This reality comprises a
multitude of facets, among which we can cite: local-global tensions, structural
issues, political power that is shaping the economy and vice-versa, relationshipsRoxana Bobulescu 42
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between States and foreign firms, between national actors and global
institutions.
Integration of the “international” in the new political economy is one example of
concerns about ontology. Political economy cannot be restricted to the national
sphere, as very few fundamental issues have remained strictly national. The
international and the national are inseparable, state-market dynamics embedded
in partnerships, agreements or international standards (a state-market
condominium, an integrated system of governance).
Structure-agency view
The structure-agency relationship defines the nature of the political economy.
According to Lawson, social phenomena depend on “human (intentional)
agency”. Social science, which includes economics, has set out to discover the
social structures (rules, social relationships) that comprise what we can call
“social reality”, the researcher’s field of investigation. The existence of this
reality has been demonstrated by a relationship of causality. Indeed, it is the
“scientific” nature of the economic and more generally social discourse that
requires demonstration that these social phenomena, inasmuch as they are the
objects of study, are real and irreducible. The causality which allows us to
confirm this reality arises from intentional human activities, such as speaking,
withdrawing money from the bank and driving, all of which are perfectly
observable. These acts are only possible through the existence of language rules,
a banking system or a highway code. These rules pre-existed and determined the
acts cited. This pre-existence confers autonomy, and consequently their reality is
proven. “If it is the dependency of such structures upon human agency that marks
them out as being social, it is their ability, in turn, to make a difference to (to
enable as well as to constrain) physical states, or actions, that (just as with non-
perceivable objects of the natural realm such as gravitational and magnetic
fields) establishes that they are real” (Lawson 2003: 148).
In the social field, human structures and human agency are interdependent.
They are two aspects of the same process; it is therefore necessary to understand
the nature of this process. To understand social mechanisms, we must carry out a
historical and geographic analysis as an “inescapable hermeneutic moment in
social science” (Lawson 2003: 149). Indeed, to explore the interdependence of
structures and social practices we need to go back to the origins of theseThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:2 (2011) 43
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practices, back to the elements that will enable us to explain the social function.
Consequently, Lawson defends the non-predictive and purely explanatory nature
of social science:
“Recent developments in realist social theorising have shown the ‘deductivist’
framework of mainstream economics, with its ultimate recourse to positing
correlations of events or actualities (whether real or fictitious), to be
unsustainable as universalising orientation for social research and historically
responsible for the contemporary failings and disarray of the economics
discipline. The perspective stylised here as critical realism gives reason to resist
any insistence upon always pursuing (strict) event regularities of the sort in
question. Rather it construes science as a fallible social process which is
primarily concerned to identify and understand structures, powers, mechanisms
and their tendencies (my emphasis) that have produced, or contributed in a
significant way to the production of some identified (real) phenomenon of
interest – mechanisms, etc., which if triggered, are operative in open and closed
systems alike. It is a conception in which science is characterised by its
retroductive mode of inference, by the move from knowledge of some
phenomenon existing at any one level of reality, to a knowledge of mechanisms
at a deeper level or stratum of reality, by which the original phenomenon of
interest was generated.” (Lawson 2003: 150).
Lawson is calling for a more critical conception of social theorising. The next
session intends to demonstrate how critical IPE responds to this challenge.
“States and Markets”: a critical realist assessment
I will examine the work of Susan Strange, one of the most influential IPE
authors, hence compare Critical IPE with the ‘Economics as Social Theory’
project.
The point of comparison will be Strange’s book “States and Markets”. I have
selected this book for discussion for two reasons. First because of the enormous
impact it had on the future development of IPE, especially concerning the
British School. Second, because of the importance given to the nature of
theorisation in social science (one section of the book is entitled “Nature of the
theory in social science”) with an overriding concern for not only ontology, but
also methodology, thus revealing a desire to adapt the method of investigationRoxana Bobulescu 44
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and explanation to the nature of the object being studied. This was pioneering
work, with strong implications for the future orientation of theoretical
developments. Strange and Lawson share the same conception. For Strange, like
for Lawson, the structure-agency relationship is at the heart of political
economy. Applied to IPE, this relationship can be translated as “authority-
market” (Strange 1994: 232). In Strange’s view, the authority is represented by
the state, the non-state and international organisations. International
bureaucracy (IMF, WTO) and national governments shape the rules for the
market play in the era of globalisation. This explains the “social reality”, the
existence of social structures as pre-existing rules in Lawson’s sense. These
structures interact with human agency, both being aspects of the same process.
Strange asserts that markets (the play of human agency) and authority are
interdependent. The “social reality” of markets is perfectly observable and can be
considered as an autonomous object of study. Strange describes the “geometry of
markets” (Strange 1994: 232) in terms of general trends in prices, the number of
producers and buyers. The variable geometry of markets calls into play
structural changes. The different social groups (producers, consumers, creditors,
debtors) are affected by the distributional consequences of these changes.
Integrated world markets reshape the market-authority balance in the sense that
it gives a few states great influence on the international rules. The powerful
states will influence other states and international organisations, and will
benefit from the new distribution of wealth. A perfect illustration of this effect
could be, for example, the way trade performance in global markets invested
China with an increasing authority in IR. By including markets in her
approach of IPE, Strange initiated a “new realist ontology” (Tooze 2000: 287),
away from state-centred analysis which predominated in mainstream IR. This
new ontology is a radical one, because it denies the validity of mainstream
ontology (Tooze 2000: 287).
The work States and Markets by Susan Strange was an attempt to apply a
politico-economic synthesis to IR. According to Strange, trans-national actors
(firms, financial organisations, religious organisations, universities and
scientific communities) are indispensable partners for States. However, she
distanced herself from R. Cooper’s interdependence theory of 1968, which set the
foundations for the American IPE School. Cooper’s reasoning concerned the
erosion of international regimes. Strange felt closer to Krasner’s vision, which
considered regimes a variable determinant of hegemonic power and its objectives,The Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:2 (2011) 45
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whereas the American school considered regimes a ‘status quo’, and questioned
neither the sources of the power nor the reasons for which certain principles,
standards or rules were imposed on others. In Strange’s vision, the concept of
“power” could not be limited to the effect exerted by the state directly on the
market but included the effects exerted indirectly on the conditions in which the
market operated. This means that the state does not need to intervene directly to
influence the market but only needs to modify the rules of the game. Power
determines the relationship between authority and market, i.e. the way authority
is exercised in deciding how big a role to give markets and under what rules to
let them function. Let us consider two different forms of authority, such like a
state-run, command based economy versus a free market, private enterprise
economy. Strange draws attention to the importance of the two forms in shaping
the context for the market play. That is not only a matter of freedom for market
operators, but the context reflects a certain distribution of power. The context
can be depressed, stable, booming, secure or insecure, and this is an indirect
effect of authority on the context in which markets function. For example, the
deregulation of air transport reflects a loss of authority by the IATA cartel over
the air travel market. This is a direct effect. [1] The indirect effect operates on
the tourism industry, on reservation and hotel building companies (Strange
1994: 23).
For Strange, there are three sources of power - force, wealth and moral
authority (powerful ideas being accepted). The fundamental question is the way
in which power is used, how it distributes wealth to different social groups in
the system (companies, organisations). The critical IPE envisioned by Strange
has its starting point in the examination of power. This is a critical realist
feature, as Lawson put it, identifying and explaining structures, powers,
mechanisms and their tendencies (Lawson 1997). The IPE agenda can be
summarised in three steps: who-gets-what, the mix of basic values, and political
solutions to change the system.
Susan Strange’s ambition was to formulate an approach that reconciled the
different ideologies, with the dynamics of change at its centre. She signalled the
end of dominance by the mainstream current of IR, by developing an approach
that was more in keeping with structuralism. Strange was inspired by Antonio
Gramsci, a structuralist who was close to Marxism and who favoured radical
change in economic and social relations, a “post-Westfalian” world order that
would be set free from the predatory behaviour of States.Roxana Bobulescu 46
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For Strange, from the 1960s onwards, change dynamics no longer existed at the
level of States and international organisations (as was the case in the
mainstream IR approaches), but existed at the level of the relationship between
States and Companies (States and Markets). This historically dated paradigm
change calls for a theorisation of political economy, perceived in the world of
political science as an aphorism: ‘the economists are to blame’. Strange claims
that the distinction between two possible forms of power – structural and
relational [2] – became far more relevant than the previous one between
economic and political power. Structural power is far more important than
relational power in shaping the global economy conditions for states, for
organisations, for companies, professionals and scientists. [3] The use of
structural power as a unifying concept rebuilds the political economy project
dismissed by mainstream economics, and attempts to build the interdisciplinary,
pluralist social science envisioned by Lawson.
Social theory: structure - agency
Strange and Lawson share the same point of view concerning the meaning of the
“scientificity” of social science, in particular the non–predictive nature of its
theories: “This is where social science differs from natural science. Natural
science can aspire to predict. […] Social science can never confidently predict. […]
The one social science that has most notably aspired to predict is economics. But
its record of success is so abysmal that it should make all those who seek to
emulate the economists and to borrow from them try something else. Economists
are particularly bad at predictions when it comes to the world economy because
many of the basic themes regarding international trade and exchange rates are
based on assumptions that no longer hold well in the present state of the
integrated world market economy.” (Strange 1994: 11)
For Strange, the scientific criteria are rationality and impartiality, and the
systematic formulation of explanatory propositions. She deplored the inferiority
complex that “social scientists” felt with regard to “natural scientists” and more
specifically that felt by “political economists” with regard to “economists”
(Strange 1994: 10-11). She revolted against the meaningless search of laws of
international systems or regularities. [4]
Strange offered a structural analysis of the relationship between States and
Markets: “I am suggesting here a way to synthesize politics and economics byThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:2 (2011) 47
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means of a structural analysis of the effects of states – or more properly of any
kind of political authority – on markets and, conversely, of market forces on
states.” (Strange 1994: 13-14) The relationship between states and markets
reflects the interdependence between human agency and structure. Structure is
determined by market relationships as defined previously by political power.
Ontological research in IPE appears clearly in Strange’s book: she advocates the
adaptation of the analytical method to the object being studied, asking for more
realism and pragmatism in a normative field: “What we have to do, in short, is
to find a method of analysis of the world economy that opens the door of student
or reader choices and allows more pragmatism in prescription; and, secondly, a
method of analysis that breaks down the dividing walls between the ideologues
and makes possible some communication and even debates between them.”
(Strange 1994: 16-17) [5]
Strange chooses taxonomy instead of theory building. She refutes simplifying
devices borrowed from other social sciences like the prisoner’s dilemma or
demand curves, while claiming that quantitative techniques are merely
platitudes reinforcing conventional wisdom. In Lawson’s vein, theory is not
meant to prescribe and predict like in natural sciences, because there are many
irrational factors in human behaviour. Both Lawson and Strange report the
abysmal success of economic predictions. When it comes to prescription, there
are value choices involved in it and these are exogenous to the theory (Strange
1994: 12). Like Strange, Lawson insists on the non predictive and purely
explanatory nature of social science because there are no such “laws” or
“regularities” like in natural sciences. He scrutinizes the social phenomenon
using a “retroductive” or “abductive” (Lawson 1997: 80) mode of inference, which
moves from the surface of the phenomenon (knowledge) to the mechanism
underlying it.
Strange insists on the role of structures and of the history of institutions in the
determination of human agency, i.e. acts and decisions of international players,
belonging to different structures, but, at the same time, interacting with each
other, creating new international rules. As for critical realism, social structures
are the product of past actions and are ontologically irreducible to “current
human agency and interaction” (Lewis 2004): “The definition, therefore, that I
would give to the study of international political economy is that it concerns the
social, political and economic arrangements affecting the global systems ofRoxana Bobulescu 48
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production, exchange and distribution, and the mix of values reflected therein.
These arrangements are not divinely ordained, nor are they the fortuitous
outcome of blind chance. Rather they are the result of human decisions taken in
the context of man-made institutions and sets of self-set rules and customs. […]
Consequences today – for states, for corporations, for individuals – imply causes
yesterday. There is no way that contemporary international political economy
can be understood without making some effort to dig back to its roots, to peer
behind the curtain of passing time into what went before. Of course, there is no
one ‘correct’ interpretation of history. […] But that does not mean that history
can be safely ignored.” (Strange 1994: 18)
According to Strange, there are basic social values: wealth, security, freedom,
justice. Different societies combine these values according to their priorities,
which Strange represents by a pyramid, each face of which corresponds to one of
the four values. She also uses a comparison with chemistry; the structure of
different societies is like the structure of molecules composed of elements in
different proportions:
“Once you have a society, therefore, you have arrangements made which provide
some wealth, some security, some element of freedom of choice for the members
or groups of them, and some element of justice. These basic values are like
chemical elements of hydrogen, oxygen, carbon, and nitrogen. Combined in
different proportions, they will give quite different chemical compounds.
Societies differ in the proportions in which they combine the different basic
values.” (Strange 1994: 17)
If these values can be accepted as choices made by individuals and by society as a
whole, we are obliged to abandon assumptions of pure economic rationality.
According to Underhill, who endorsed Susan Strange’s IPE approach, Homo
oeconomicus metamorphosed into a “social” individual, whose choices and actions
are both economic and political: “We are all political and economic agents at
one and the same time, whatever the historical context. This argument is
important because it re-establishes the role of agency, the capacity to make
normatively informed policy choices concerning the nature and direction of the
current global transformation.” (Underhill, 2000: 824)
The next session argues that Strange’s structural power is a critical realist
approach of IR.The Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:2 (2011) 49
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Structural power from a critical realist perspective
For critical realists, the distribution of power within society enables certain
individuals to control the activities of others by persuading them to act in their
interests and according to their objectives even though these choices are not in
keeping with the wishes of the individuals being controlled. This is made
possible by limiting choices. It is the power to impose constraints that conditions
the activities of many humans. Lawson scrutinized social mechanism as causal
power of structures: “The conception I am proposing: complex thing […] which,
by virtue of their structures, possess certain powers […] to act in certain ways
and to facilitate various activities and developments.” (Lawson 1997: 21) Lawson
argued that by investigating structures we can infer something about their
powers. The aim of science is to analyse the structure of internal relations
underlying power (Lawson 1997: 133).
Power is the main actor in Strange’s work. Her aim is to show “how power has
been used to shape the political economy and the way in which it distributes
costs and benefits, risks and opportunities to social groups, enterprises and
organisations within the system” (Strange 1994: 24). Keeping in mind ontology,
she goes so far as to consider power as inherent in the IPE, and therefore
requiring appropriate hypotheses and a methodology, which take into account
the different ideologies and systems of underlying values: “it is particularly
important to try to clarify the assumptions about power that underlie a
particular view, such as mine, of the nature of the IPE and how it works.”
(Strange 1994: 24)
According to Strange, structural power influences decisions without manifestly
showing it; it fixes the rules of the game without putting direct pressure on
agents to make certain choices. History is important to explain the origins of
power. The huge oil companies have the power to look for petroleum and sell it.
In the 1950s and the 1960s, petroleum producing States could sell their
concessions. The royalties paid by the oil companies gave them structural power
over the oil producing States. This source of revenue was extremely important,
and this is why, later, when the States had consolidated their financial
situation, they were able to defy the power of the companies, as happened in Iran
and Indonesia in 1951. Structural power gives decisive power to one of the
parties in a negotiation. This example unveils the peremptory influence of
structural power, which may seem less visible than relational power. WithoutRoxana Bobulescu 50
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apparent pressure on the others, the possessor of structural power can narrow or
broaden their range of choices.
Susan Strange identified four sources of power [6]: production, finance, security
and knowledge. Power is gained 1) by controlling the security of individuals, 2)
by deciding the production conditions, 3) by the offering of credit and 4) by
managing technological knowledge, beliefs and ideas. Added to these four main
sources are the secondary sources: means of transport, trade, energy and wealth.
Structural power derives from these various sources, as illustrated by the United
States. In the wake of the Second World War, the United States demonstrated
its military and strategic superiority in its conventional forces vis-à-vis
European States as well as in its non-conventional forces vis-à-vis the Soviet
Union. According to Strange, however, this military superiority alone would not
have been enough to impose American domination on Western economies. It was
considerably aided by US superiority in both production and financial
infrastructures (through the status of its currency, the dollar), by the US ‘moral
authority’, by the confidence in the ability of the United States to take on both
this hegemony and the creation of a new world order. Strange (1994) considered
the United States a vast deterritorialized empire, organized around huge
multinational companies. This hegemony will last as long as the United States
maintains its ability to persuade the rest of the world to cover its huge
deficit. [7]
Social construct in IR: Social construct in IR: Social construct in IR: Social construct in IR: Social construct in IR:
the  the  the  the  the International Organisation  International Organisation  International Organisation  International Organisation  International Organisation School School School School School
Opposing mainstream neo-utilitarianism
The social constructivist project [8] in the field of IR emerged in the 1990s and
clearly defined itself as an alternative way of thinking, distinct from the
mainstream, in the International Organisation journal (Special Issue 52:4,
1998). The project was described in detail by Ruggie (1998) in a paper that
triggered a rethinking of the theoretical development of IR and IPE. This new
orientation, inspired by the Weberian sociology, linguistic philosophy (Searle,
1995) and post-modern or post-structuralist theory [9], was clearly stated by
Ruggie as being a constructivist one, whereas, as we have demonstrated above,
Susan Strange’s radical ontology should be viewed as critical realist. As aThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:2 (2011) 51
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consequence, the American School gained impetus to become the dominant
philosophy in IR, while the British critical IPE remained somehow marked
with Marxist suspicion. It is important to know that Susan Strange did not want
to appear as a leader of one particular school of thought, but as being really
concerned with a pluralistic approach, leaving space for different world visions
to coexist.
However, both heterodoxies have a critical orientation, dealing with the
limitations of the mainstream neo-utilitarianism (i. e. neo-realism and neo-
liberal institutionalism both being dominant approaches in the 1980s). We will
see that their responses also have common features. Both are directed against the
hypothetic-deductive method and claim a more realistic approach, one being
more Weberian and the other more Marxist in orientation. Moreover, they are
both concerned with a shift from the very limited mainstream ontology. In this
way, we can call them heterodoxies. They are inductive in orientation, treating
time and space contingency as an endogenous factor in explaining structure,
agency and system transformation.
In his article, Ruggie (1998) stresses the ‘ideational factors’ and their role in
international life. These factors encompass “identities, norms, aspirations,
ideologies or simply ideas about cause-effect relations” (Ruggie 1998: 855).
However, they are difficult to grasp using the dominant post-war IR theories.
Even idealism, developed after realism and liberalism, was not enough to
understand the importance of ideational, intersubjective factors and how they
function. Like Lawson, Ruggie is unsatisfied with the homo oeconomicus
assumption imported from microeconomics and the strictly utilitarian
rationality.
For Ruggie, there is a subjective dimension of human activity, which cannot be
taken into account by using rationality in the utilitarian frame. The attitude is
defined by social constructs (culture, identity, ideology) and not only by the
objective pursuit of material interest: “America’s choice of the specific features of
the post-war institutional frameworks – be it the United Nations, indivisible
security commitments in NATO, or non-discriminatory norms in trade and
monetary relations – cannot be rendered accurately merely in terms of marginal
utility but also reflected America’s sense of self as a nation.” (Ruggie 1998: 863).
The social constructivist project is thus concerned with the socially created
reality which rests on linguistics. Unlike Lawson, who proved the reality ofRoxana Bobulescu 52
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social facts since they can be observed in the material world, constructivists hold
that social facts cannot be observed. For social constructivists, human mind or
consciousness in IR is the origin of socially constructed reality, revealing
identity and interests. In fact, the actors on the international stage are not homo
oeconomicus, but interconnected social beings, with a subjective insight. Social
constructivism does not question the constrained nature of human behaviour
(since structure conditions human agency) but considers that this is not the
whole picture. Constructivists search for a larger, more encompassing view than
structuralism, which is only a part of the social scientific enterprise. Structure
and human agency are simultaneous, interacting through human consciousness.
Social constructivists and critical realists agree upon the significance of
ideational factors in international life and the fact that they depend on time and
place, but disagree when it comes to explaining this dependence. For
constructivists, identities are generated in part by international interaction in a
continuous causal relation. States’ identities and interests are not given and
fixed. There is no pre-existing reality, or pre-existing structure to condition
human action, either at individual or aggregate level:
“Social constructivism rests on an irreducibly inter-subjective dimension of
human action. As Max Weber insisted at the turn of the century, we are cultural
beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude
towards the world and to lend it significance.” (Weber 1949: 81). This capacity
gives rise to a class of facts that do not exist in the world of physical objects:
social facts, or facts that, in the words of the linguistic philosopher John Searle,
depend on human agreement that they exist and typically require human
institutions for their existence (Searle 1995: 2). “Social facts include money,
property rights, sovereignty, marriage, football, and Valentine’s Day, in contrast
to raw observational facts such rivers, mountains, population size, bombs,
bullets, and gravity, which exist whether or not there is agreement that they do.
In short, constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in
international life. In contrast to neo-utilitarianism, constructivists contend that
not only are identities and interests of actors socially constructed, but also that
they must share the stage with a whole host of other ideational factors that
emanate from the human capacity and will of which Weber wrote.” (Ruggie
1998: 856).
All elements composing the sense of self as a nation are determinant factors
which shape states’ interests. The Gorbachev revolution in the Soviet Union canThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:2 (2011) 53
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thus be read as an identity shift towards a transformation of the nation’s
interests. In the social constructivist perspective, the change in interest is not
only the result of constraints and opportunities in the international context, but
also the result of an endogenous shift in identities, which are embedded in the
domestic norms and institutions. All the elements defining national identity and
aspirations are socially constructed and fluctuating. Social constructivists seek
to identify and explain these elements before turning to IR. Institutions and
organisations must be understood in a non-linear manner, by revealing their
multi-facets and permanently changing nature. For constructivists, the
ideational factors are endogenous factors in IR, thus escaping from their
“exogenous variables” status in mainstream theory (Ruggie 1998). They are part
of the ontology. In order to assess the impact of ideational factors on IR,
regarded as complex systems of beliefs, the social constructivist researchers
attempted some documented, empirical studies among which one can find studies
on decolonization, on the growing significance of human rights, on the role of
multilateral norms in stabilizing the consequences of rapid international
change, and on the increasingly non-discriminatory humanitarian interventions.
One of the key explanations of the impact of shared beliefs on the patterns of IR
is the existence of “epistemic communities” as a dominant way of looking upon
the social reality (Ruggie 1998), that is to say transnational networks of
knowledge-based experts who have a growing influence on policy, international
and domestic agendas. They disseminate norms and thus contribute to the social
construction of reality (Finnemore & Sikkink 2001: 402). This is the case, for
example, with ecological organisations pushing forward their vision of the
future through intense lobbying and activities. Ideational factors and
organisations are shaping each other so that it is very difficult to treat them in a
simple cause-effect sequence. To escape this dilemma, constructivism prefers to
treat them as reasons for action instead of causes of action. Like critical realists,
they reject the deductive method and adopt the explanatory framework: “Suffice
to say that these factors [ideational] fall into the category of reasons for actions,
which are not the same as causes for actions. Thus, the aspirations for a united
Europe has not caused European integration as such, but it is the reason the
causal factors (which presumably include bipolarity and economic interests)
have had their specific effect – in Weber’s words, produced an outcome that is
historically so and not otherwise. Absent those ‘reasons’, however, and the same
‘causes’ would not have the same causal capacity” (Ruggie 1998: 869).Roxana Bobulescu 54
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Ruggie’s assertion allows us to think more broadly about the nature of causality.
General, global causes have specific, local effects. Social norms have different
influences on different agents. Sustainability norms, for example, are spreading
worldwide. But their implementation is highly dependent upon local conditions,
history, cultures, institutions and social aspirations of the populations. These
sustainability norms will not cause the same sustainability policies everywhere.
The reasons for action are specific and intervene in different local situations.
For example, a strong commitment to environmental preservation in certain
places, like in the Scandinavian Peninsula, represents a strong reason for action.
On the contrary, a lack of concern about the environmental risks renders the
sustainability norms inefficient, because local agents (companies, organisations,
individuals) will not strive for their implementation.
Constitutive rules
The ideational factors, such as social constructions, are reasons for actions. They
can change the causality chain and reorient it towards one which is more in
tune with the system of “intersubjective beliefs” (Searle 1995). According to the
linguistic philosopher John R. Searle, these beliefs are social facts, and as such,
they are an object of study.
Given these considerations, how can we explain the “intersubjective beliefs”? As
social constructs, they are based upon individual beliefs which emerge in
individual minds. Individuals believe and then intend to take a given action. But
when each individual “intends”, this is only a small part of a “collective
intentionality”. As Searle puts it, “we intend” is the result of many “I intend as
part of our intending”. This is the way he defines “collective intentionality”.
Beliefs and intentions remain essentially individual, while their effect is
collective because they are present in all minds as a social fact.
To clarify this point, let us consider conventions. They are a social fact, existing
in individuals’ minds and collectively accepted. They condition the functioning
of society as a whole, like norms and rules. The individual intentionality is part
of the collective one, characterised by shared beliefs. At this point, another
question arises. What makes these shared beliefs emerge? According to social
constructivism, money is a social construct. It exists by virtue of collective
intentionality. Individuals believe that the money is accepted by the others, so
they intend to exchange money any time in any place. The erosion of this sharedThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:2 (2011) 55
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belief will drastically modify the collective intentionality. Consider, for
example, the dollarization taking place in Latin American countries.
Individuals no longer believe that their fellow man will automatically accept
the local money, but they believe that their fellow man will accept the dollar as
replacement money. The collective intentionality will thus confirm the new
monetary system based upon the dollar.
Social facts exist because there is a shared belief and a corresponding norm
emerging from it. This observation is highly important because it distinguishes
social facts from physical or natural facts. According to Ruggie, social facts
exist by virtue of constitutive rules: “We can readily imagine the act of driving a
car existing prior to the rule that specified ‘drive on the right (left)-hand side of
the road.[…] Specifying which side of the road to drive on is an example of a
regulative rule.[…] Rather, the rules of chess create the very possibility of
playing chess. The rules are constitutive of the chess in the sense that playing
chess is constituted in part by acting in accord with the rules. Regulative rules
are intended to have causal effects – getting people to approximate the speed
limit, for example. Constitutive rules define the set of practices that make up a
particular class of consciously organized social activity – that is to say, they
specify what counts as that activity” (Ruggie 1998: 871).
The distinction between constitutive and regulative rules is at the heart of the
social constructivist project. An activity is defined by its constitutive rules.
Payment by credit card depends on the constitutive rules of the monetary or
banking system. The act of selling a house is based upon the constitutive rules of
the property rights. Every social activity must be understood as fundamentally
determined by constitutive rules. The regulative rules intervene at a later stage,
when or if there is a need to modify or restrict an activity. In the case of the two
previous examples – money and property rights – regulative rules restrict, for
example, the use of money and the fixation of prices. They may change, but this
change does not fundamentally affect the social nature of money and property
rights. They only alter their functioning. By contrast, constitutive rules
generate the necessary preconditions of human activity: “Constitutive rules are
the institutional foundations of all social life. No consciously organized realm
of human activity is imaginable without them, including international politics”
(Ruggie 1998: 873).Roxana Bobulescu 56
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In the field of IR and IPE, constitutive rules define, for example, the
sovereignty of the states. The constitutive rules can be found at the origin of the
international organisations (the UN, the Monetary Fund and the World Bank).
The regulative rules intervene afterwards and allow a smooth, adaptable activity
in each organisation.
Social constructivists consider themselves as contributing to building and
explaining theoretical foundations of IR and IPE, like that of organisation
studies in general. Their contribution would thus go far beyond the limits of
modern economic theory. As a matter of fact, the marginal utility analysis does
not account for the constitutive rules of markets and organisations, as they
consider them to be exogenous factors. Social constructivists want to fill this gap
by searching for endogenous explanations of social facts. In this context,
constitutive rules are used to describe reasons for actions that condition cause-
effect chains. Market conventions, for example, are the constitutive rules which
allow market rationality such as the maximization of revenue to emerge.
Another example is the exclusive territoriality defining the limits of land. This
exclusive territoriality is so largely and commonly accepted that it ceased to be
considered as a constitutive rule. It is a given, exogenous fact in international
trade theory as much as in IR and IPE. The durability of exclusive territoriality
rests on collective intentionality, even if at the beginning seizing a piece of land
was a physical action. (Ruggie 1998). If the collective intentionality changes, as
in the case of ex-Yugoslavia, it will be followed by conflicts and physical actions
to redefine territorial limits. Social constructivists are concerned with the
constitutive rules but do not have a theory yet. By contrast, neo-utilitarians do
not include the constitutive rules in their ontology but limit themselves to
regulative rules. Neo-utilitarian models of IR are imported from mainstream
economics and analyse economic rules. Therefore, they totally ignore the fact
that the economy is embedded in broader social, political and institutional
frameworks, governed by constitutive rules that make possible the development
of economic relations.
Let us consider the state system. The very concept of modern state resulted from a
new constitutive rule, namely the reciprocal sovereignty that replaced the
constitutive rule of heteronomy. The very concept of institution is absent from
neo-utilitarian IR.The Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:2 (2011) 57
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Another example is the hinge between the concept of promise, which is a
regulative rule, and the institution of contracts, which is a constitutive rule.
The problems of cheating and incomplete contracting are properly described
within the framework of contract theory. Promises are embedded in contracts.
The regulative rules are useless if the partners do not understand and legitimate
the contract institution. Therefore, constitutive rules lay the foundation for
social actions.
Structure and agency
With respect to structure and agency, the two views (critical realism and social
constructivism) truly diverge. Critical realists consider the reality as given. In a
given structure, the interests of different actors may be derived from the current
state of knowledge, production, security and finance (Strange 1994). There is a
clear causality link between structure and agency and thus no room for
interpretation of reality as a conscious process in actors’ minds.
Unlike critical realism, social constructivism focuses on the active process of
interpretation and construction of reality. What happens in the actor’s mind
that will trigger action? How do actors understand circumstances? How do
actors currently redefine their interests and preferences in times of crisis and
discontinuities? Social constructivists have been criticized on the grounds that
they mix up structure and agency. Is this attack justified? As an answer,
constructivists put forward Giddens’ (1981) theory of structuration. According to
this theory, structure has a dual nature, as it is at once constraining human
action and (re)created by it. The crucial distinction from critical realism is the
adverb “at once”. There is no delay between the creation of structure (which has
been made by previous human actions) and the constraint exerted on agency as
found in Lawson’s view. For constructivists, structure and agency are the two
faces of the same phenomenon interacting in a simultaneous manner. According
to Giddens, “structural principles are principles of organisation implicated in
those practices more ‘deeply’ (in time) and ‘pervasively’ (in space) sedimented into
society.” (Giddens 1981: 55). Giddens’ duality of structure has been applied in IR
theory by Ruggie (1983), Wendt (1987) and Dessler (1989).
Giddens claims that transformation patterns are not predetermined. That is
because of the time-space contingency of the duality of structure. The duality is
in fact an inclusive concept which integrates structure and agency. Thus, forRoxana Bobulescu 58
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social constructivism they are no longer separate objects of study. Agency and
structure are born together in the process of identity formation and ideas. The
structure simultaneously acts as a constraint and an enabler of social agency.
Concerning space, social constructivists go far beyond critical realists in
assessing the changing nature of space: “It is a social construct that people,
somehow, invent” (Ruggie 1998: 876).
But time contingency is not questioned by social constructivism, even if
structure and agency overlap and even if history plays a very minor role in their
approach. However, introducing time in the analysis as an endogenous factor is
a common concern of social constructivism and critical realism. Both want to
understand the “making” of circumstances and do not want to merely observe the
“finding” of circumstances: “The distinction between finding and making
circumstances is especially critical at times of discontinuity such as the world
has experienced since 1989. The core foreign policy problem for states then
becomes precisely how to redefine their interests and preferences vis-à-vis the
international order. It is not surprising that the mainstream theories have been
so incoherent in the face of these discontinuities.” (Ruggie 1998: 877)
However, social constructivists and critical realists do not have the same reading
of discontinuities. Social constructivists relay on discourse analysis in order to
identify ideational factors. Consider the collapse of Soviet Union and the end of
the Cold War as a major discontinuity in IR. Havel’s discourse to the NATO
(1990) reveals his aspiration to Western identity, a purely ideational factor
analysed by Ruggie in the following excerpt:
“The constructivist approach has received a ringing (though presumably
unintended) endorsement from Czech President Vaclàv Havel, whose country has
been invited to join NATO: ‘If we in postcommunist countries call for a new
order, if we appeal to the West not to close itself off to us, and if we demand a
radical reevaluation of the new situation, then this is not because we are
concerned about our own security and stability… We are concerned about the
destiny [in our countries] of the values and principles that communism denied,
and in whose name we resisted communism and ultimately brought it down.’ In
short, according to Havel, the would-be NATO members are asking for
affirmation that they belong to the West – an affirmation of identity from
which concrete interests and preferences flow.” (Ruggie 1998: 877)The Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:2 (2011) 59
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For social constructivists, discourse analysis reveals the importance of ideational
factors such as identities, aspirations redefining the interests of the actors, and
thus of their agency. History is not ignored, but is considered insufficient to
explain agency. Social constructivists integrate subjective factors in the analysis
of the post-communist era. The reflexive thinking shapes individuals’
understandings of the structural conditions, and they adapt their behaviour to
these new understandings. The changing social knowledge of society determines
social action. For social constructivists, identities and interests are two
expressions of the duality of structure. In this perspective, Havel’s discourse
reveals both identity and interest. The collapse of communism is not a sufficient
factor to explain the Czech President’s pro-NATO commitment in a
predetermined frame. The ideational factor of identity and the understanding of
the current situation are the reasons for action.
In contrast, critical realists analyse the Czech intention to join the NATO as an
effect of the structural power of the US, which is conditioning the behaviour of
ex-satellites of the Soviet Union. The same could be said concerning their
intention to join economic organisations, financial structures and Western
markets. Human agency expresses the power relations that stem from the
structure of reality.
Final remarks Final remarks Final remarks Final remarks Final remarks
The social constructivist project asserts that ideational factors, and not only
material ones, intervene in human agency. The most important ideational
factors are to be found in “intersubjective beliefs”, and these shared beliefs
explain the interests and identities of actors in IR (Finnemore & Sikkink
2001:393). The ideational ontology that characterises constructivism and its
holistic perspective opposes individualism. This can be seen as a common feature
between critical realism and social constructivism, generally speaking.
After a close scrutiny of both methods and their application in IR theory it is
obvious that the frontiers between them are not so sharp. Both are heterodox
approaches, wishing to break with the mainstream, neo-utilitarian theory of IR.
They hold a pragmatic, more realistic view and search for a redefinition of
ontology, thus giving birth to a pluralist approach.Roxana Bobulescu 60
Bobulescu, Roxana (2011) ‘Critical Realism versus Social Constructivism in international
relations’, The Journal of Philosophical Economics, IV:2, 37-64
The permeability of the frontiers becomes obvious if we consider that there are
also versions of constructivism. Ruggie identified at least three constructivist
approaches. Firstly, there is the neo-classical constructivism (Katzenstein,
Ruggie) with a pragmatic orientation. Secondly, there is the postmodern
constructivism, inspired by Nietzsche, then by Foucault and Derrida. Thirdly,
there is a mixed constructivism (Wendt, Dessler), called “naturalistic
constructivism”, a sort of a continuum between the first two versions.
The neo-classical version of constructivism is close to critical realism in its goal,
i.e. a unified social science. Neo-classical constructivism has called for
pragmatism and has developed analytical tools for intersubjective meanings, like
the theory of communicative action, speech-act theory and evolutionary
epistemology. It is also close to critical realism in its commitment to the idea of
social science as being more “plural” and more “social” than the mainstream
theory, and whose insights are temporary and unstable.
The postmodern version of constructivism stresses the “linguistic construction of
subjects” and puts forward an epistemic break with modernism. This version
clearly diverges from critical realism. For postmodern constructivism, ontology
is based on discourse. It imposes a “hegemonic discourse” as object of study. Social
science thus becomes a discourse analysis, which evacuates causality and leaves
space for the coexistence of different modes of interpretation of social facts, each
one with its own consequences.
The mixed version of constructivism also differs from critical realism in its
naturalistic conception of social science. Lawson and Strange have insisted upon
the difference between social and natural science, stressing the non-predictive
nature of social theorising. But according to Wendt, a “naturalistic” social
science is possible, rooted in the philosophical doctrine of “scientific realism”
(Bhaskar 1979). The idea of an autonomous social reality can also be found in
Ruggie: “Scientific inquiry of both material and social worlds deals largely with
nonobservable, be they quarks or international structures, and much of the time
even the intersubjective aspects of social life exist independently of the mental
states of most individuals that constitute it.” (Ruggie 1998: 882) This scientific
project of social constructivism reconciles it with the mainstream, neo-
utilitarian approach and in the same way explains the coexistence of the two
approaches in the American IO School.The Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:2 (2011) 61
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An overview of these methodological options in IR calls for several remarks. The
orientation that deeply marks the social constructivist project is sociology and
linguistic philosophy. Divergent versions of constructivism coexist, which deny
or accept the very possibility of a scientific method. In contrast, critical realism
is characterized by a positivist approach, rooted in the realist view of science
implicit in Marxism. Thus, there is nothing strange about the fact that the
critical realist orientation has a more economic view. The British School is
more concerned with economics than its American counterpart. That was one of
the reasons why Susan Strange put such a great emphasis on the “States and
Markets” topic. Another important feature of the British critical realist IPE is
the importance of history. It is one of the epistemological touchstones of the
British school because it rises so many questions about the best way to treat
history in the analytical works of IPE.
My last point is a call for a thorough global perspective which combines the two
methodologies. The two can complement each other and thus remedy reciprocally
their main weaknesses. Social constructivism offers a way of addressing the
nature of social life and social interaction, without making claims about their
specific content. This constitutes a weakness. An analytical complement could be
found in a critical realist approach, which would provide a more specific
understanding of the relevant actors in IR. Similarly, critical realists tend to
undervalue the ideational factors that shape international relations, as they are
not concerned with human consciousness and its role in interpersonal and social
life. An emphasis on ideas as vectors of human agency could help the
understanding of human agency and structure in critical realist IR.
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Endnotes Endnotes Endnotes Endnotes Endnotes
[1] The direct effect is exercised by agent A on B, while the indirect effect is
exercised by A on C via B (A-B-C transitivity).Roxana Bobulescu 62
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[2] Strange made a distinction between two forms of power: the first is relational
(A orders B); the second is structural (A conditions B and influences the
relationship between B and C).
[3] Strange argues that structural power “shapes and determines the structures of
the global political economy within which other states, their political
institutions, the economic enterprises and (not least) their scientists and other
professional people have to operate. […] it is the power to shape frameworks
within which states relate to each other, relate to people, or relate to corporate
enterprises.” (Strange 1994: 24-25)
[4] “The ambition in the social sciences to imitate the natural sciences and to
discover and elaborate ‘laws’ of the international system, patterns so regular that
govern social, political and economic behaviour, is and always has been a wild
goose chase.” (Strange 1994: 16)
[5] Palan aknowledged the simplicity and efficiency of expression in Strange’s
explanatory works but deplored her reluctance to engage in theoretical debates,
which led some of her commentators to call her a ‘naive empiricist’ (Palan 1999:
122-3). In her view, a general, encompassing theory was neither possible nor
desirable, so she never claimed to build a theory of IPE.
[6] Strange’s vision of power breaks with the Marxist and neo-Marxist (Cox
1987) overemphasis on the structure of production.
[7] Two additional examples address the origins of structural power. The first
example is the Mafia organisation and its coercive force, its wealth and
financial capacity to benefit from the lack of control of the state-based
structures over drug and arms illegal markets. The second example reveals the
coercive structural power of the Anglo-American navy over the market during
World Wars I and II. Military Anglo-American forces could seize the ships and
the cargo of merchants from neutral countries if they suspected them of trading
with the enemy. (Strange 1994: 32-33)
[8] For a thorough review of the constructivist project in IR, see Finnemore &
Sikkink (2001).
[9] Post-modernism is the broader term referring to a current of thought
developed since the late 1960s. More specifically, postmodern theory refutes the
modern belief that theory grasps reality. Instead, theoretical constructs areThe Journal of Philosophical Economics IV:2 (2011) 63
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cognitive representations that are historically and linguistically mediated.
“Postmodern theory also rejects modern assumptions of social coherence and
notions of causality in favour of multiplicity, plurality, fragmentation, and
indeterminacy. In addition, postmodern theory abandons the rational and
unified subject postulated by much modern theory in favour of a socially and
linguistically decentred and fragmented subject.” (Kellner, Best 1991: 10) The
narrower term of post-structuralism refers to the works of five French theorists
in the 1980s, namely Jacques Derrida (philosophy), Michel Foucault (history),
Jacques Lacan (psychoanalysis), Julia Kristeva and Roland Barthes (literature).
Their common attempt is to cross disciplinary boundaries and use rhetorical
analysis to reveal the primacy of the signifier over the signified and emphasise
the instability of meaning.
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